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In the common agency problem multiple mechanism designers si-
multaneously attempt to control the behavior of a single privately
informed agent. The paper shows that the allocations associated with
equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms can be
reproduced as equilibria relative to (some subset of) the set of menus.
Furthermore, equilibria relative to the set of menus are weakly ro-
bust in the sense that it is possible to ¯nd continuation equilibria so
that the equilibrium allocations persist even when the set of feasible
mechanisms is enlarged.
The set of direct mechanisms1 forms a universal class of mechanisms for
problems in which a single principal tries to control the incentives of one or
more agents. These mechanisms are universal in the sense that the payo®s
(or allocations) generated by any indirect mechanism can be reproduced by
¤Thanks are due to Larry Epstein, Meg Meyer, Carolyn Pitchik, Lars Stole and Sergei
Severinov for helpful comments. The ¯nancial support of the Social Sciences and Human-
ities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
1Early references include Gibbard [5], Green and La®ont [6], and Myerson [10].
1an appropriate direct mechanism. An immediate implication is that the most
pro¯table direct mechanism is always at least as pro¯table as any indirect
mechanism. In this sense, optimal direct mechanisms are robust in the sense
that sellers will continue to use them even if the set of feasible mechanisms
is enlarged.
It has been known for some time that 'direct' mechanisms of the usual sort
do not have these properties when there are multiple principals competing
against one another.2 The di±culty is that agents have market information
at the time that they communicate with principals and 'naive' direct mecha-
nisms do not allow sellers to use this information. Alternatively, a complete
description of the agent's preferences (and beliefs) is not enough to reveal the
agent's `type' in the sense of Harsanyi. Examples in the literature show that
equilibrium in direct mechanisms is not robust against the possibility that
the mechanism designers might deviate outside this class of mechanisms,3
and that there are classes of indirect mechanisms whose equilibrium allo-
cations cannot be replicated when sellers are compelled to use only direct
mechanisms4.
At a conceptual level, this problem has been resolved by Epstein and
Peters [4] who construct a universal set of mechanisms based, in part, on
a rede¯nition of an agent's type. This set of mechanisms has both the de-
sirable properties that the set of direct mechanisms possesses in the usual
single principle problem. First, any indirect model of competition among
mechanism designers gives rise to a set of feasible mechanisms that can be
embedded into the universal set of mechanisms. Secondly, equilibria relative
to the universal set of mechanisms are robust in the sense that equilibria will
continue as equilibria when the set of feasible mechanisms is extended.
The set of types involved in such a construction are complex. First of all,
since type contains market information, it is endogenous. Second, even in sin-
gle agent environments where the principals' beliefs are common knowledge,
2The basic problem with direct mechanisms in competing mechanism design problems
was ¯rst observed by McAfee [9] and Katz [7]. Examples illustrating the di±culties that
arise are given in [8], [14], and [4]
3An example is given in Martimort and Stole [8].
4Martimort and Stole [8] give an equilibrium in which sellers use reasonable looking
indirect mechanisms. Peck [14] gives an example of a non-truthful equilibrium in direct
mechanisms whose allocations cannot be replicated in any equilibrium in which sellers use
direct mechanisms.
2the principals' mechanisms can depend on one another in complex ways. For
example, seller 1's mechanism may depend on whether seller 2's mechanism
depends on whether seller 1's mechanism depends ::: and so on. So the set
of agent's types must come from an in¯nite dimensional space even when the
set of agent's types is ¯nite in the conventional sense. So despite the fact
that a universal set of mechanisms is known to exist, it is di±cult to use this
result in practice.
The purpose of this paper is to ask whether the construction of a universal
set of mechanisms is simpler in a more specialized environment. The natural
candidate for such an investigation is that class of problems where multiple
principals attempt to control the incentive of a single agent. This model
has been the focus of the emerging literature on common agency.5 One of
the methods that has been used to analyze problems in this framework is to
imagine that the principals o®er the agent menus of alternative from which
he can choose. In the single mechanism designer problem with a single agent
who has private information but takes no unobservable action, menus of
alternatives are clearly equivalent to direct mechanisms6. This is true no
matter how complicated the type space is, any contract that asks the agent to
report a type is o®ering the agent a menu of alternatives of some kind. The
purpose of this paper is simply to evaluate menus as an appropriate model of
competition among mechanism designers when there is only a single agent.
As will become apparent, menus are not universal in the sense of Epstein
and Peters [4].7 The universal set of mechanisms has the property that any
arbitrary class of indirect mechanisms can be embedded into it. In this sense,
the universal set extends any arbitrary set of indirect mechanisms. It creates
new deviations that can destroy equilibrium relative to some arbitrarily re-
stricted set of indirect mechanisms. It also creates mechanisms that can be
used to support equilibrium outcomes that cannot be supported relative to
arbitrarily restricted sets of indirect mechanisms. The embeddings (in this
universal class) associated with menus and alternative sets of indirect mech-
5For example, Bernheim and Whinston [1], Martimort and Stole [8]or Biias, Martimort
and Rochet [2].
6It has been suggested to me that this is referred to as the 'taxation principle' although
I am unsure of the source of this term.
7For the same reason, menus are not universal in the way that direct mechanisms are
universal in the single mechanism designer problem. Arbitrary indirect mechanisms cannot
be uniquely associated with some speci¯c menu.
3anisms will generally intersect, without any associated proper containment.
The di±culty is that the same menu o®ered in di®erent ways (that is to
say, o®ered as alternative indirect mechanisms) can induce di®erent continu-
ation equilibria. To account for this, the universal set of mechanisms must be
at least as large the set of all menus plus the set of all continuation equilibria
associated with those menus. Menus alone cannot be used to describe more
general indirect mechanisms.8
However, menus possess properties weaker than universality in common
agency problems that are almost as good. The ¯rst theorem presented below
shows that any equilibrium relative to some set of indirect mechanisms can
be translated into an equilibrium relative to some subset of the set of menus.9
This translation does not preserve payo®s in the way that translations into
the universal set of mechanisms does. However the translations of indirect
mechanisms played along the equilibrium path do preserve payo®s so that
the equilibrium payo®s relative to some set of feasible indirect mechanisms
can be 'represented' as equilibrium payo®s relative to some restricted set of
menus. This means that if there are models of indirect competition that
have desirable properties, like robustness [4], then it must be possible to
characterize the associated equilibrium payo®s as equilibrium relative to the
set of menus.
This result does not imply that every equilibrium in menus is necessarily
interesting. The set of menus is a strict subset of the universal set of mech-
anisms, so it is likely that some equilibrium relative to the set of menus will
not be robust to the possibility that principals can deviate to more compli-
cated mechanisms. This property is the key property of the universal set of
mechanisms discussed in Epstein and Peters [4]. Equilibrium relative to the
universal set of mechanisms will continue as equilibria no matter how the
set of feasible mechanisms is extended. The second result in the paper is
concerned with this issue.
8It might seem that all that this requires is that the seller o®er a menu along with a
suggestion about how the agent should choose from the menu (following Myerson). The
di±culty with this approach is that the suggestion that the seller makes to the agent should
depend on the agent's true type. Since this type depends on the market information that
the agent has, this immediately makes the problem as di±cult as trying to describe a
universal set of mechanisms.
9As will be seen, the menus that are needed are more complex than those that have
traditionally been used in the literature.
4Unfortunately menus do not have the strong robustness properties of
equilibria relative to the universal set of mechanisms. However, they do have
a weaker robustness property in the sense that for any extension of the set of
mechanisms, it will always bepossible to construct a continuation equilibrium
for the extension such that the payo®s from the original equilibrium are
preserved.
1 Basics
There are n sellers dealing with a single buyer. The terms buyer and seller
need not be interpreted literally. This terminology is common in the litera-
ture on competing mechanisms ([9],[15], or [4]). The literature on common
agency has been more creative in generating examples, for example multi-
ple lenders dealing with a single borrower (Biias Martimort and Rochet [2]
and Parlour and Rajan [13]), multiple regulators overseeing the operation
of single ¯rm (Bernheim and Whinston [1]) or multiple lobbyists trying to
in°uence government policy (Dixit and Grossman [3]). The trading process
begins when sellers simultaneously announce the mechanisms they plan to
use. An important assumption is that the buyer observes market information
completely while no seller can directly observe the mechanism that has been
o®ered by any other seller. After seeing the contracts o®ered by each seller,
the buyer communicates with sellers and take actions that a®ect the payo®s
of all the sellers.
The primitives of the model are
A: space of `simple' actions available to each seller
E: space of actions that the buyer carries out for the sellers
-: valuations space (including the `usual type' of a buyer)
F: cdf according to which (all sellers believe) the buyer's valuation is drawn
To avoid measure theoretic considerations, it will be assumed that the sets
A, E and - are all ¯nite. An element of the set A is a complete description
of the contractible part of the relationship between the seller and the buyer.
This would include any transfer between buyer and seller and any action
5taken by the seller. Actions for the seller might include contracts that specify
contractible actions that the buyer has to take. An important assumption is
that sellers cannot write contracts contingent on the contract o®ers or actions
of the other sellers. The set E describes the set of uncontractable actions
available to the buyer. The set E might consist of a vector of e®orts that the
buyer undertakes for each seller. Alternatively, in a competing mechanism
problem, E is just a list of all the sellers. The buyer's choice simply re°ects
the mechanism that the buyer chooses to participate in.
Buyers and sellers have expected utility preferences. Sellers' payo®s are
represented by v : An £ E ¡! [0;1]. For the buyer, payo®s are represented
by the function u : An£E£- ¡! [0;1]. To simplify some of the arguments
below, it is assumed that there is an action a that each seller j can take such
that for any aj 2 A
u(a;a¡j;e;!) · u(aj;a¡j;e;!)
for all a¡j 2 An¡1; e 2 E and for any ! 2 -. This action is used at various
points to prevent the buyer from sending messages the seller does not want
to hear under any circumstances.
1.1 Standard Model of Competition
For any measurable set X, Let 4(X) denote the set of probability measures
on X. When a topology on 4(X) is needed, the topology of weak con-
vergence is assumed. For any x 2 4(X), let suppx be the support of the
distribution x. Fix a measurable space of messages C that the buyer can
send to a seller. For simplicity it is assumed that this set of messages that
the buyer can send to each seller is the same. Let R be the (measurable)
set of responses that sellers can send back to the buyer. Both these message
spaces are assumed compact metric, but beyond that are perfectly general in
the degree and nature of the communication about the other sellers' mech-
anisms that they permit. For example, the messages could allow the buyer
to communicate the mechanisms being used by other sellers. The messages
could be contingent plans describing the way the buyer will communicate
under di®erent circumstances.
An indirect mechanism °j for seller j speci¯es feasible messages, C and
R, as well as the probability distribution over actions and messages that the
6seller will use to respond to any message that the buyer sends him. So °j is
a measurable map from C into4(A£R). With a slight abuse of notation,
let ° = f°1:::°ng refer to the entire array of mechanisms o®ered by the
sellers. For any particular element of 4(A £ R), each report r 2 R that
is sent with positive probability induces a unique posterior belief about the
probability with which the seller has chosen each action. This posterior
probability lies in 4(A). Since Bayes rule involves a measurable map from
R ! A, each mechanism can be associated with a measurable map from
C into 4(A£ 4(A)). In words, each message induces a joint distribution
on actions and posterior beliefs. It will be convenient below to think of
indirect mechanisms in this way. It will be assumed in the sequel that the
image of each feasible °j is closed in 4(A £ 4(A)).
Denote by ¡ the set of feasible indirect mechanisms, endowed with some
topology. The goal of this paper is to try to characterize `good' models
of indirect competition, i.e., to specify `good' choices for ¡. Good models
of indirect equilibrium should be such that equilibrium exists, so for the
purposes of this paper, it is innocuous to assume that ¡ has the `usual'
desirable properties, for example that it is compact metric.
The allocations are then determined by the following process. First, sell-
ers simultaneously and publicly announce the mechanisms that they plan to
use to determine their allocations. The buyer then communicates with each
of the sellers by sending each of them one of the messages in the sets Cj
that they specify. The sellers respond and choose actions according to the
°j that they have committed themselves to. Once the buyer sees the sellers'
response to his message, he chooses his e®ort.
The simplest example might be price competition. Suppose that each
seller has a single unit of output to o®er and that the buyer wishes to purchase
exactly one unit. Each seller announces a price. The buyer chooses one and
only one seller as a potential trading partner after seeing the prices that the
sellers have to o®er. In this case there is no communication, so that C and
R are empty for every seller. The buyer's e®ort is simply the seller that he
selects, so that E is simply a list of all the sellers.
Buyer behavior in each mechanism depends on the buyer's valuation and
on the mechanisms that he observes being o®ered by the other sellers. A
communications strategy is a measurable mapping ~ c : -£¡n ! 4(Cn) that
describes the (probability distribution over) messages that the buyer will send
to the sellers as a function of the buyer's type and the array of mechanisms
7that he is o®ered by the sellers. A decision strategy ~ ¼ : -£¡n £Cn £Rn !
4(E) is a measurable mapping that describes the probability distribution
the buyer will use to choose his action as a function of his type, the array of
mechanisms that he has been o®ered, the messages he has sent, and the array
of messages received from the sellers. The pair (~ c; ~ ¼) together constitute
a continuation strategy for the buyer. Say that the continuation strategy
(e c; ~ ¼)is a continuation equilibrium if the buyer has no incentive to deviate
from this strategy for any of his valuations; for any array of mechanisms
o®ered by the sellers, or for any array of messages that he receives from the
sellers.
Again, since ¡ is intended to represent a reasonable model of the compe-
tition among the sellers, it is natural to assume that continuation equilibria
exist. It is not di±cult to construct models of indirect competition where
continuation equilibrium do not exist (one mechanism might be - I will trade
with the buyer who names the largest integer).10 It is also easy to think of
models of indirect competition where sellers can o®er mechanisms that do
not make sense (each seller o®ers a price equal to the price o®ered by the
other seller). There is no need to worry about whether such models are good
descriptions of competition between sellers - it is immediately apparent that
they are not. Thus in the discussion that follows we restrict attention to
indirect models that possess all the usual desirata of predictive models.
It should also be noted that when a particular continuation equilibrium is
assigned, this does not involve or require that this continuation equilibrium
be unique. A mechanism is of interest to a seller partly because of the
continuation equilibrium that it delivers. Alternative equilibrium selections
will be interpreted as alternative models of indirect competition in this paper.
When we want to emphasize the underlying set of indirect mechanisms ¡
we refer to(e c; ~ ¼) as a continuation equilibrium relative to ¡. When we wish to
emphasize a particular array of mechanisms, we refer to (~ c(¢;°); ~ ¼(¢;¢;°))as
a continuation equilibrium relative to °.
The key to the standard (one seller) revelation principle, is that compos-
ing a mechanism with buyers' strategies yields a mapping from valuations
into actions, or in other words, a `direct mechanism'. In the context of this
10In fact Myerson [12] gives an example in which the sellers equilibrium does not exist
when sellers are constrained to use naive direct mechanisms in which the buyers report
only their types.
8paper, there is a corresponding composition. Let
m~ c;~ ¼ : - £ ¡
n ¡! 4(A
n £ E), (1)
be the joint distribution of actions and e®orts induced by a particular con-
tinuation equilibrium (~ c; ~ ¼).
These de¯nitions make it possible to describe the buyer's and seller's
payo®s. Suppose that the competing ¯rms choose the randomizations ± =
f±1:::±ng with ±k 2 4(¡) for all j = 1:::n, and that buyer behavior is
described by the continuation equilibrium strategy (e c; ~ ¼). The buyer's payo®
depends on the mechanisms that sellers o®er. Let ° = f°1:::°ng be any
array of mechanisms. Then the payo® that the buyer gets is




u(a1:::an;e;!)dm~ c;~ ¼ (!;°) (2)
The seller who chooses the randomization ±j expects the payo®










v(a1:::an;e)dm~ c;~ ¼ (!;(°j;°¡j))dF (!)
In an obvious notation, d±¡j (°¡j) = fd±1;:::d±j¡1;d±j :::d±ng.
Say that (e c; ~ ¼;±1;:::±n) is an equilibrium relative to (M;¡), or simply
that (¡; e c; ~ ¼;±1:::±n) is an equilibrium for M, if: (e c; ~ ¼) is a continuation
equilibrium and for each j = 1;:::n and
±j 2 arg max
±02¢(¡)
V¡(±
0;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼).
It should be apparent from this that the actions that any particular seller
takes, and the e®ort level that is induced depend not only on the buyer's
valuation but also on the mechanisms that have been o®ered by the other
¯rms. It might seem reasonable to model common agency in the familiar
way by having sellers choose allocations in response to the buyer's reports
9about preferences. As actions and e®orts will generally depend on mecha-
nisms o®ered by other ¯rms, it should be clear that the allocations and e®ort
induced by some models of indirect competition will not be reproducible with
this kind of direct mechanism. This was illustrated initially by the example
in Peck [14]. A complete series of examples illustrating the pitfalls of this
approach are given in Martimort and Stole [8] for the common agency case.
2 Menus
In the simplest single seller single buyer problem, any direct mechanism as-
signs an outcome to each report the agent makes about his type. No matter
how complex the type space is for the agent, the range of this mapping ob-
viously constitutes a menu of alternatives from which the agent can choose.
This works in reverse as well, since every menu of alternatives can be written
as an incentive compatible direct mechanism that yields the same outcome.
It is natural to enquire whether this approach might work in the common
agency problem when there is a single agent.
In it's simplest form, a menu is simply a mechanism with a message space
equal to the set of actions A along with a mapping °¤ : A ! A satisfying
°¤ (a) 2 fa;ag for all !. The interpretation is that the mechanism °¤ either
gives the buyer the action that he requests, or gives the buyer a. The seller's
message space R is set equal to the empty set. This is the approach taken
in [2] who allow the sellers to compete in non-linear pricing schemes. The
action that the seller takes in that case consists of the monetary transfer and
an asset trade.
In general, mechanisms formed by o®ering menus of this kind will be
restrictive since sellers might want to exploit buyer risk aversion by o®ering
random mechanisms in which the buyer is o®ered a distribution over the set
of outcomes for some of his types. If the seller does this, he might also want
to send a random reply to the buyer that is correlated with the action that
he chooses in order to maintain some connection between his action and the
e®ort that the seller makes. Menus of the simple kind described above can
not be used to reproduce this kind of behavior.
So to model menus in this more general setting suppose the seller uses
the message space R = 4(A) and let A¤ = 4(A£ 4(A)). The message
that the seller sends in this case should be interpreted as a recommendation
10to the buyer about the posterior probability with which he should believe
that the seller has taken the various actions. An action for the seller is then
a joint distribution over simple actions and signals. In the formulation that
follows the seller will o®er the buyer the choice from a menu of actions in A¤.
For this reason, the set of messages C available to the buyer will be equal to




a a 2 P
a0 a = 2 P
for some closed subset P ½ A¤, where a0 is a degenerate measure that assigns
all probability weight to the outcome a and sends the degenerate message a
with probability 1.
The following theorem shows that arbitrary indirect mechanisms can be
replaced with mechanisms in which sellers o®er the buyer a menu of alter-
natives (from A¤). This new menu is simply the set of alternatives that
the buyer could have induced in the original direct mechanism by sending
appropriate messages to the seller.
Theorem 1 Suppose that ¡ is some space of indirect mechanisms; let (e c; ~ ¼;±1;:::±n)
be an equilibrium relative to ¡. Then there is a map Ã : ¡ ! ¡¤, an array
of randomizations (±¤
1 :::±¤
n) over ¡¤ and a continuation equilibrium (c¤;¼¤)




¤;!) = U¡(°;~ c; ~ ¼;!)
for all ! and for all ° 2 ¡n; and





¤) = V¡(°j;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼)





¤) · V¡(±j;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼)
11Every equilibrium relative to ¡ has a payo® equivalent representation in
¡¤ where the representation is given by the mapping Ã. The representations
are equivalent in the sense if all sellers mechanisms are translated into ¡¤ the
buyer gets the same payo® in the continuation equilibrium relative to these
translated mechanisms as he does in the original continuation equilibrium.
Furthermore sellers gets the same payo® from translated mechanisms as they
receive in the initial equilibrium provided that they play one of their equi-
librium strategies. Unpro¯table deviations for sellers in ¡ correspond after
translation into unpro¯table deviations relative to ¡¤.
The translation Ã is straightforward. It simply takes all of the actions that
the buyer could have induced by sending some message to the seller, °j (C),
and o®ers this to the buyer as a menu of alternatives that he needs to choose
from. The buyer's continuation strategy is then constructed to reproduce his
behavior in the original continuation equilibrium. This preserves the payo®s
of the various players.
The proof is mathematically trivial, but complex because of thefact (men-
tioned previously) that many di®erent indirect mechanisms might translate
into the same menu of alternatives. This would not be a problem, except for
the fact that the buyer could conceivably choose from the menu and select an
e®ort in a way that depends on the manner in which the menu is presented.
An example is presented to illustrate this below.
This is the reason that o® equilibrium path mechanisms can not be trans-
lated in a way that preserves the seller's payo®s.11 If the same menu is o®ered
in two di®erent ways in the original game, and the buyer chooses di®erent
e®ort levels in response to each, then the seller's payo® will generally di®er in
the original continuation equilibrium depending on which of the two (menu
equivalent) indirect mechanisms that he o®ers.. The translation into menus
will require that the buyer respond with only one e®ort to both mechanisms.
If the two indirect mechanisms both lie on the equilibrium path, this won't be
a problem because they will generate the same payo® for the seller anyway.
All that can be guaranteed o® the equilibrium path is that the translated
mechanism will yield a payo® that is no larger than the equilibrium path
payo® in the original game.
The reader might wonder whether this problem could be resolved if the
11It bears mention here that the universal class of mechanisms described by Epstein and
Peters [4] generates a transformation that preserves these payo®s o® the equilibrium path.
12seller simply extends the menu by o®ering a message instructing the buyer
how to select his e®ort (and how to choose from the menu). This is the
approach that Myerson [11] used for the single principal problem. Indeed,
this is why the revelation principle will normally require the principal to send
a message to his agents recommending the actions they should take. This
approach is not pursued here, partly because it is unnecessary for the pur-
poses of this paper, and partly because it raises much more di±cult problems
in the multi-principal context. For example, the recommendations that the
principal makes to the agent will generally have to depend on the agent's full
type including all his market information. To construct the appropriate mes-
sages mechanism needs to deal with the conceptually complex considerations
associated with universal set of mechanisms as discussed in [4] - precisely the
considerations that this paper is trying to avoid.
The second point to keep in mind is that equilibria for sellers relative to ¡
will not generally translate into equilibria relative to ¡¤. The reason is that
¡ will typically incorporate various implicit restrictions on the mechanisms
that sellers are allowed to use. This is expressed formally by observing that
Ã(¡) ½ ¡¤. This observation explains the various failures of the revelation
principle that have been uncovered in the literature. For example it is not
hard to imagine that if the image of ¡ is 'small' enough in ¡¤ then equilibrium
outcomes relative to ¡¤ will generate payo®s that cannot be attained by any
combination of mechanisms in ¡. This is the basis of the example given in
Peck [14]. Secondly, even if the payo®s in some equilibrium relative to ¡¤
are attainable by combinations of mechanisms in ¡, these payo®s may not
be supportable as equilibria relative to ¡. This is the basis of the example
given in Martimort and Stole [8].
The third point to note is that the theorem given here is considerable
weaker than the one in Epstein and Peters [4]. In that paper conditions are
given under which every mechanism in ¡ (on or o® the equilibrium path) is
translated into a payo® equivalent mechanism in ¡¤ (again the translation
here is not payo® equivalent o® the equilibrium path).
Despite the fact that menus in A¤ are relatively tractable, they are con-
siderably more complicated than the menus that have been used in the lit-
erature. Non-linear pricing schemes, for example, involve menus of simple
actions, without any randomization of any messages from the sellers to at-
tempt to in°uence buyer behavior. The non-linear pricing problem with a
single agent is simpler than the problem considered here if the buyer takes
13no uncontractable action on behalf of the seller. In this case, there is no need
for the seller to send messages to the buyer to in°uence his e®ort, and the
set of menus of elements from 4(A) will be su±cient to prove a revelation
principle similar to the one above.
The required randomization means that this set of menus will still be
more complicated than the simple non-linear pricing schemes that have been
used in the literature. Optimal incentive schemes with risk aversion will often
require the use of random outcomes. The typical approach is to assume that
randomization is impossible. A previous version of this paper assumed that
contractible randomization was di±cult enough to keep the set of feasible
actions (of either a random or non-random kind) ¯nite. In this case, a version
of the Theorem 1 can be proved in when sellers o®er only menus of simple
actions.
3 Example
This section develops a simple example to illustrate the revelation principle
proved above. There are two sellers and a single buyer who can have one
of two possible types µ1 or µ2 with equal probability. The sellers have three
available actions called A, B, and C. The buyer does not make any e®ort
and it is assumed impossible for the seller to write contracts that commit
him to any speci¯c randomization over these three outcomes.12 The payo®s
















The ¯rst box is a variant of the example presented in Martimort and Stole
[8].13 There is an equilibrium for this problem in which both sellers o®er the
12This does not stop him, of course, from using a random strategy to choose among the
three actions.
13They describe a menu equilibrium for this box in which each seller o®ers the menu
fB;Cg to the buyer who then chooses the option B from both. This is not an equilibrium
if contractible randomizations are possible. If they are either seller can pro¯tably deviate
14action C to the buyer. This can be interpreted as an equilibrium in direct
mechanisms, where each seller o®ers a direct mechanism in which the action
chosen is independent of the buyer's report. This is also an equilibrium in
menus (in which each seller o®ers a degenerate menu).
If the competition is modelled by allowing sellers to o®er menus of simple
actions to the buyer, there is a relatively simple equilibrium in which each
seller o®ers the buyer the menu fA;Cg. The buyer chooses A from both
sellers when his type is µ2 and randomizes choosing A from one seller and C
from the other with equal probability when his type is µ1. The buyer's payo®
in this case is 3 whatever his type. Each seller gets 3 when the buyer is type
µ2 and 2 (that is, 1
25 ¡ 1
2) when the buyer is type µ1.
To show that this is an equilibrium in menus it is necessary to check that
neither seller can pro¯tably deviate by modifying the menu that he o®ers.
For example, consider the payo® that the seller can get by deleting the option
A from his menu. If the buyer has type µ1 he will choose A from the other
seller for sure and the deviating seller will get payo® 5. The downside is that
the seller now receives payo® 0 when the buyer is type µ2. This gives the
seller's expected payo® as 5=2, exactly what it was in the initial equilibrium.
It is straightforward to check that deviations to alternative menus are also
unpro¯table.14
Alternatively, considering modelling the competition by allowing sellers to
choose from a slightly larger set of contracts, consisting of all possible menus,
and all direct mechanisms (meaning that the buyer reports either µ1 or µ2 and
the seller responds with one of the actions A, B, or C). Refer to the menu
fA;Cg as the mechanism °m in this space. Then one deviation that the seller
might consider is to o®er a direct mechanism °d which chooses the action C
if the buyer reports µ1 and A if the buyer reports µ2. Suppose that the buyer
responds to this deviation by reporting µ2 to the deviator no matter what his
to a random mechanism (that is, a degenerate menu from 4(A)) that chooses action A
with small enough probability. I am indebted to Sergei Severinov for pointing this out to
me.
14If contractible randomizations are possible, this menu will not be an equilibrium. A
pro¯table deviation would involve o®ering a menu consisting of the outcome C for sure,
or a random outcome that provides A with high probability and C with complementary
probability. If the buyer has type µ1 he can no longer randomize, but is forced instead to
choose the outcome C for sure with the deviator. Since the option A is still available, the
buyer will choose it when he has type µ2.
15type is (so that the deviator always chooses A). Then, when the buyer's type
is µ1 he chooses the action C from the other seller's menu. This continuation
equilibrium makes the deviation strictly unpro¯table since the deviator loses
any chance at the payo® 5 that he gets with positive probability along the
equilibrium path.
To translate °d into the corresponding menu observe that if the other
seller o®ers the degenerate menu consisting only of the action A than the




is just equal to the menu
consisting of the options fA;Cg, obviously the same as Ã(°m). The same
menu of options can be o®ered in two distinct ways, and the buyer responds
to these o®ers di®erently. This di®erence makes the sellers pro¯t strictly
lower when he o®ers °d than when he o®ers °m in the original game. Then
when the mechanism °d gets translated into ¡¤ the payo® that the seller
gets from the translation is strictly higher than the payo® he got from the
deviation in the original equilibrium. Nonetheless the payo® is no larger than
his equilibrium payo® as speci¯ed by Theorem 1.
This example has another property. Turn the argument around and imag-
ine starting with the set of menus and extending the set of mechanisms avail-
able to the seller to include direct mechanisms. Whether the sellers will
continue to o®er the menu fA;Cg depends on how they expect buyers to
respond.. If the buyer is expected to report truthfully when the seller de-
viates to the direct mechanism °d, then the equilibrium in menus will fall
apart since the deviating seller will then ensure the payo® 5 for himself when
the buyer has type µ1. This illustrates that the equilibrium in menus is not
robust in the sense of Epstein and Peters [4].
This leads nicely into the second theorem in the paper. There is a con-
tinuation equilibrium that could be assigned to the deviation that will break
up the equilibrium, but there is also one that will preserve it. The theorem
in the next section shows that this is generally true with common agency.
4 Weak Robustness
The wide use made of direct mechanisms (or menus) in single mechanism
designer problems stems from two facts - ¯rst, direct mechanisms are simple.
Perhaps more important, once sellers ¯nd the best direct mechanism they can
be sure that they cannot improve their pro¯ts any more by experimenting
16with other more complex mechanisms. Neither menus, nor direct mechanisms
have this property in competing mechanism problems. This is illustrated in
the example given above. These same examples suggest an alternative, since
the ability of the seller to increase his pro¯ts by o®ering more complicated
mechanisms seems to depend on the way that the continuation equilibrium
is assigned. Some assignments increase pro¯ts, but there always seems to be
an alternative assignment that does not increase the seller's pro¯ts. It turns
out that when there is a single agent, the property is true more generally.
The point of this section is to illustrate this idea - if sellers are constrained
to use menus of the kind described above, then there will always be a way
to assign the continuation equilibrium so that this equilibrium persists when
the set of mechanisms is enlarged.
To illustrate this idea consider two feasible sets of indirect mechanisms ¡
and ¡1. Say that ¡1 < ¡ (¡1 is bigger than ¡) if there exists an embedding
®0 : ¡ ! ¡1. This idea is natural, there are more mechanisms in ¡1 than in
¡. Now take two models of competition with feasible sets of mechanisms ¡,
and ¡1 and such that ¡1 < ¡. Let the associated continuation equilibria be
(~ c; ~ ¼) and (~ c1; ~ ¼1) respectively. As before, let m~ c;~ ¼ (¢;°) and m~ c1;~ ¼1 (¢;°1) be
the joint distributions on actions and e®ort induced by these continuation
equilibria when the array of mechanisms on o®er are ° and °1 respectively.
The continuation equilibrium (¡1;~ c1; ~ ¼1) is said to extend (¡;~ c; ~ ¼) if there is
an embedding ® : ¡ ! ¡1 such that for all ° in ¡n
m~ c;~ ¼ (¢;°) = m~ c1;~ ¼1 (¢;®(°))
The generalization of the idea behind direct mechanisms in the single
mechanism designer problem is to imagine sellers exploring more complex
mechanisms (in ¡1) that are not envisioned by the 'ad hoc' model of com-
petition speci¯ed in the economic model of competition (i.e., ¡). A sensible
model of competition is one that has the property that the equilibrium al-
locations that it describes do not disappear when new, more complicated
mechanisms are added to the sellers' feasible sets.
De¯nition 2 (Strong Robustness) An equilibrium (¡;~ c; ~ ¼;±) is said to
be strongly robust if for any extension (¡1;~ c1;¼1) for which ¡1 is compact
metric, (¡1;~ c1; ~ ¼1;®[±]) is an equilibrium, where ®[±] is the randomization
on ¡1 induced by ± and ®.
17Strongly robust equilibria are analyzed in Epstein and Peters [4]. As
shown in the example above, equilibria in menus are not strongly robust. If
menus have desirable properties at all they must be weaker than full robust-
ness.
De¯nition 3 (Weak Robustness) An equilibrium (¡;~ c; ~ ¼;±) is said to be
weakly robust if for every compact metric ¡1 < ¡ there exists an extension
(¡1;~ c1; ~ ¼1) such that (¡1;~ c1; ~ ¼1;®[±]) is an equilibrium, where ®[±] is the
randomization on ¡1 induced by ± and ®.
This lead to our second result
Theorem 4 In the common agency problem with a single agent, let (¡¤;c¤;¼¤;±¤)
be an equilibrium. Then (¡¤;c¤;¼¤;±¤) is weakly robust.
To see the idea behind the proof, it might help to consider the case where
there is only a single mechanism designer. For any arbitrary mechanism
° that this seller o®ers from ¡, the image ° (C) is the 'menu' of alternative
actions that the buyer can choose from. Typically there will be one (or more)
mechanisms ° in ¡ that o®er the buyer the same menu of alternatives as
°¤ 2 ¡¤. Typically these will yield the seller a di®erent payo® than the payo®
he gets from °¤. The reason for this is that the continuation equilibrium will
induce the buyer to send di®erent messages and take di®erent actions than
he does when he sees °¤. This is precisely why the seller might like the larger
set of mechanisms. Yet since the menu of actions and e®orts available to
the buyer is the same when he is o®ered ° as it is when he is o®ered °¤,
the maximum payo® that he can attain from both mechanisms must be the
same. This means that a new continuation equilibrium can be constructed
by having the buyer choose from the 'menu' associated with ° in exactly
the same way as he does when he chooses from the menu °¤. Then, in this
new continuation equilibrium, the seller must get the same payo® when he
o®ers ° as he does when he o®ers °¤. With this construction, every payo®
that the seller can attain in ¡ coincides with a payo® that he could have
attained in ¡¤. It follows immediately that whatever was optimal for the
seller relative to ¡¤ will then be optimal relative to ¡. The proof simply
extends this reasoning to the case where there are many sellers.
185 Conclusion
In the case where many principals try to control the incentives of a single
agent, the competition among them can be e®ectively modelled by having
them o®er alternative menus to agents. This model will be 'e®ective' in two
ways. First, equilibria from arbitrary competitive models can be represented
as equilibria relative to (a subset of) the set of menus. Secondly, equilibria
relative to the set of all menus are weakly robust. So, equilibria in menus
need not fall apart when the set of mechanisms is extended.
Despite the fact that common agency is now a common way of modelling
incentive problems, an obvious shortcoming of the analysis in this paper
stems from the fact that there is only a single agent. Unfortunately, the
methods presented here do not suggest any extension to the multiple agent
case. Even if there is only a single principal, menus o®er little advantage
with multiple agents, because the choice from the menu is a 'joint' choice
(of all the agents) not an individual choice. A key part of the argument in
Theorem 1 relies on the fact that when a single agent faces the same choice
set o®ered in two di®erent ways, his optimal choice from it will always give
him the same payo® - even when this choice varies with the way the choice set
if o®ered. When multiple agents are o®ered the same normal form game in
di®erent ways, it is quite possible that the equilibrium that they choose (and
consequently every agents payo®) will vary. Once the principal is required to
send instructions to the agents about how to play a game, an in¯nite regress
emerges - the principal's recommendation about how to play should depend
on whether the other principals' recommendations depend on whether the
principal's recommendation depends::: and so on. It is possible to deal with
this (see [4]) but the appropriate set of mechanisms is complex.
6 Appendix - Proofs
We begin with some basic de¯nitions and relationships. For any subset P ½
A¤ de¯ne ¯(P) : A¤ ! A¤ such that
¯ (P)(a) =
(
a if a 2 P
a0 otherwise (4)
19In words, ¯ (P) is a function that responds to any joint distribution (action)
in P with the same joint distribution (over actions and messages), otherwise
it responds with a0 (recall this is a degenerate distribution that assigns all
probability weight to the pair (a;a)). With this understanding, we will refer
to ¯(P) as a menu of alternatives from A¤.
Each mechanism °j and report c produces a joint distribution over simple
actions and messages for the seller. Each message that the buyer receives
induces some posterior belief in 4(A) about the simple action that the seller
has undertaken. Thus each report that the buyer makes to the seller induces
a pure action in A¤ ´ 4(A £ 4(A)). With a slight abuse of notation,
de¯ne the set of actions (in A¤) that the buyer can induce by sending some
message to the seller as °j (C) ½ A¤. Recall that this set is closed in A¤ by
assumption.
The buyer chooses his e®ort after observing the message associated with
the action a¤ 2 A¤. Together, the sellers' strategies ±, the continuation
strategies (~ c; ~ ¼)and the buyer's type ! induce a joint distribution over (A¤)
n£
E.
De¯nition 5 For any D ½ ¡n such that the ±(D) > 0 de¯ne b(!;D) to
be the joint distribution on (A¤)
n £ E induced by the equilibrium (¡;~ c; ~ ¼;±)
conditional on the sellers' mechanisms being drawn from the subset D ½ ¡n.15
Write bA¤ (!;D) as the marginal distribution of b on the space of actions,
(A¤)
n.
Write (a;q) as a typical element of A £ 4(A). Since the buyer's posterior
beliefs are de¯ned before he is forced to choose an e®ort, the utility associated
with any particular array of actions a¤ 2 (A¤)




















With this notation, the buyer's payo® in any continuation equilibrium
can be written as
U¡(°;~ c; ~ ¼;!) =























j 2 °j (C)8j = 1:::n
o
(5)
The ¯rst equality follows from the fact that every e®ort level that the buyer
takes with positive probability must maximize his interim payo®. The ¯nal
equality follows from the fact that b is the distribution associated with a
continuation equilibrium following °. The use of max instead of sup in the
¯nal operation results from the assumption that a continuation equilibrium
always exists.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. To begin, the map Ã is described, and the strategies that sellers and
the buyer use in the continuation equilibrium relative to the new space of
mechanisms are described. De¯ne the transformation Ãj from ¡ into ¡¤ as
Ãj : °j 7¡! °
¤
j (¢) = ¯ (°j (C))(¢)
This transformation simply converts a mechanism °j into the menu of alter-
natives in A¤ that it provides. Let ±¤
j be the measure induced by ±j on ¡¤ by
this map.
Ãj will generally be a many to one mapping with inverse correspondence
Ã
¡1
j (¢). Choose an arbitrary selection ¹ Ã
¡1
j (¢) from this correspondence. For
any collection f°¤
1 :::°¤



































We can now specify the continuation equilibrium relative to ¡¤. Begin
with the case where °¤ = 2 Ã(¡)
n. By the de¯nition of ¡¤, The buyer must
choose a distribution over actions from each seller that lies in a closed subset
of A¤, as well as an e®ort from a ¯nite set. Since the buyer's payo®s are
linear (by expected utility) with respect to the distribution of actions that
sellers choose, they are continuous. It follows that a best choice-action pair
from each menu exists for the buyer. So it will always be possible to assign
21some continuation equilibrium to the array of mechanisms. Since arrays like
this will play no role in what follows, the continuation equilibrium can be
assigned in any convenient fashion.















n)g) denotes the marginal distribution on
(A¤)
n induced by b(!;fB1(°¤
1);:::Bn (°¤
n)g).
To de¯ne the buyer's e®ort choice, let a¤ = fa¤
1;:::a¤
ng denote the buyer's
actual choice from the menu o®ered by each seller, and let q 2 4(A)
n be the
array of messages that the buyer receives. Note that the buyer's posterior
beliefs (after seeing the sellers' messages) also lie in 4(A)
n. The buyer












n)gja¤;q) is the distribution of e®ort induced
by b(!;fB1(°¤
1);:::Bn (°¤
n)g) conditional on the sellers' actions being given
by a¤ and the buyer's posterior beliefs being given by q.
The next step is to show that this strategy constitutes a continuation
equilibrium, and that the buyer's payo® when he follows this continuation
strategy in the transformed problem is the same as his payo® in the original
problem. To begin, consider the payo® that the buyer receives in the contin-
uation equilibrium relative to (°¤;c¤;¼¤) after choosing the array a¤ from the
various sellers menus, and receiving the array of messages q from the sellers.

















Consider any action a¤
j in the menu o®ered by seller j. By construction,
each such action must coincide with a joint distribution of simple actions
and posterior beliefs that the buyer can induce (by sending appropriate mes-
sages) to the seller in the continuation equilibrium relative to (°j;°¡j;~ c; ~ ¼)





. It follows that any message qj that the buyer could
receive when he selects a¤
j from seller j0s menu must be equal to the cor-
rect posterior for a conditional on that message. Then from the properties
22of the continuation equilibrium (~ c; ~ ¼) every e®ort level in the support of
bE (!;fB1(°¤
1);:::Bn (°¤
n)gja¤;q) must maximize the buyer's expected pay-





























The buyer selects according to the distribution bA¤ (!;fB1(°¤
1);:::Bn (°¤
n)g).






























j (¢;°j;¢)8j = 1:::n
o






the choice sets in this last expression are the ones o®ered in the menus as-
sociated with the mechanisms in °¤, this line veri¯es that the continuation
strategy speci¯ed for the buyers is a continuation equilibrium. Finally ap-
plying (5) once again gives this payo® equal to
= U¡(°;~ c; ~ ¼;!)
which establishes the ¯rst property in the theorem.





¤) = V¡(°j;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼)



























































j;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼)
If °¤






is an element of the support of ±j. Since ±j is an equilibrium distribution for
seller j, every °0
j in it's support gives the same payo®. Thus the integrand
in this last expression is constant and equal to












j;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼) = V¡(¹ °;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼) · V¡(±j;±¡j; e c; ~ ¼)
which proves the theorem.
6.2 Proof of theorem 4
Proof. Let (¡;~ c; ~ ¼) be an extension of (¡¤;c¤;¼¤) with embedding given
by ®. The method of the proof is to convert deviations that lie outside of
the range of ® into the menus that they do provide, and then change the
continuation equilibrium associated with those menus to coincide with the
original equilibrium.
Use the transformation Ã from Theorem 1 to associate with each mech-
anism °j 2 ¡ the corresponding menu °¤
j (¢) = ¯ (°j (C))(¢). Now let
24D(°1;:::°n) ½ 4(An £ E) be the set of joint distributions over simple ac-
tions and e®orts that can be induced with some distribution of messages
and some e®ort choice strategy, given the mechanisms f°1;:::°ng. If the
buyer if o®ered an array of mechanisms f°1;:::°ng in the continuation equi-
librium relative to ¡, he can induce any array of actions fa1;:::ang in the
set °1(C) £ ::: £ °n (C) ´ °¤
1 (¢) £ :::°¤
n (¢) ½ (A¤)
n by sending appropriate
messages to the sellers. It follows that D(°1;:::°n) = D(°¤
1;:::°¤
n). Since
(c¤;¼¤) is a continuation equilibrium relative to ¡¤, mc¤;¼¤ (!;°¤
1;:::°¤
n) max-
imizes the expected utility over D(°¤
1;:::°¤
n) of a buyer of type !. It follows
immediately that this distribution maximizes the buyer !'s expected util-
ity over the set D(°1;:::°n). Choose any continuation strategy ~ c¤ and ~ ¼¤
relative to ¡ that satis¯es
m~ c¤;~ ¼¤ (!;°1;:::°n) = mc¤;¼¤ (!;Ã(°1);:::Ã(°n))
(this strategy exists by the de¯nition of D). Since D(°1;:::°n) = D (Ã(°1);:::Ã(°n))
this continuation strategy must be a continuation equilibrium.
Now we begin with an equilibrium (±¤
1;:::±¤
n)relative to ¡¤ with ®[±¤]
as the induced distribution relative to ¡. The payo® to some seller who
unilaterally deviates to a mechanism °0 outside of ®[¡¤] while all other sellers


















which implies that the equilibrium (¡¤;±;c¤;¼¤) is weakly robust.
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